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FIRST AMENDMENT ELECTRONIC SPEECH:
EX PARTE REECE, A MISSED




ELECTRONIC communications1 containing harassing threats2 arepart of the cyberbullying problem that exists in Texas with veryreal consequences for school-aged children and the vulnerable
who need protection.3 The legislature has recently modified Texas law4 to
further address online cyberbullying.5 In this light, this casenote6 analyzes
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at Dallas, May 1998. I would like to thank my wife, Alynda Long, for her loving, enthusias-
tic support while writing this casenote and for encouraging me to pursue law school. I
would also like to thank my classmate, Russ Pearlman, for providing ideas and feedback
during this process.
1. The Texas Penal Code defines electronic communications to mean “a transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical sys-
tem.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(b) (West 2017). It also lists several nonexclusive
examples. See id.
2. See, e.g., Massimo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no
pet.) (“I will kill you and your two kids.”); see also Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Gar-
cia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693, 701–02 (2012) (describing
a tragic suicide linked to cyberbullying that failed to produce a criminal conviction due to
lack of “clear guidelines” or “objective criteria” in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986 (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
3. See generally Adrienne Morris, Cyberbullying in Texas: Reform Is Necessary to
Keep the Virtual Playground Safe, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 498, 498–500 (2011) (discussing the
harms of cyberbullying in Texas); Benjamin Walther, Cyberbullying: Holding Grownups
Liable for Negligent Entrustment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 531, 532–35 (2012) (discussing the
harms of cyberbullying).
4. See David’s Law, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 522 (West) [hereinafter, David’s
Law]; Roland Rodriguez, David’s Law Takes Effect, KRISTV.COM (Sept. 6, 2017, 7:35 AM),
http://www.kristv.com/story/36299408/davids-law-takes-effect [https://perma.cc/CZ2P-
E3CD].
5. For a discussion of Texas law prior to David’s Law, see Morris, supra note 3, at
509–15. The discussion includes Texas Penal Code Section 33.07, the Texas Educational
Code, and other issues.
6. A full discussion of cyberbullying is beyond the scope of this casenote. See gener-
ally Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 2, at 718–25 (providing a cyberbullying legislative
primer).
599
600 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
Ex parte Reece7 where the defendant argued that the Texas anti-harass-
ment statute8 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. By denying
Reece’s petition,9 the Court of Criminal Appeals missed an opportunity
to prod the legislature to craft a more narrow statute that will continue to
protect vulnerable children from damaging harassment. The current anti-
harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it includes
vague terms, lacks other limiting language, and potentially extends to
non-harassing situations based on prosecutorial discretion.
Reece was charged with harassment in a county court of law; he then
filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of
the law.10 The county court of law denied his application without a pre-
trial hearing. Reece appealed to the Eastland Court of Appeals and ar-
gued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.11
Because this was a facial12 challenge to the statute, none of the facts13 of
Reece’s alleged harassment were at issue. The appellate court denied his
appeal by relying on the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals decision in
Scott v. State14 that upheld the telephone anti-harassment statute,15 which
also covers electronic communications. Therefore, the appellate court
ruled that Reece could not facially challenge the statute because it did
not implicate expression that had First Amendment protections.16 Fol-
lowing the decision of the appellate court, the Texas Court of Criminal
7. Ex parte Reece, 517 S.W.3d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam) (mem.
op.).
8. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(7) (West 2017) (The statute defines an offense
when a person uses repeated electronic communication, intends to “harass, annoy, alarm,
abuse, torment, or embarrass another,” and that communication is “reasonably likely to
harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another.”).
9. Reece, 517 S.W.3d at 109.
10. Ex parte Reece, No. 11–16–00196–CR, 2016 WL 6998930, at *1 (Tex. App.—East-
land Nov. 30, 2016) (mem. op., not designated for publication), pet. ref’d, 517 S.W.3d 108
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam) (mem. op.).
11. Id.; see also Brief for Appellant at 3, Reece, No. 11–16–00196–CR, 2016 WL
6998930, at *1 (2016).
12. A facial challenge seeks to invalidate a statute because it violates First Amend-
ment rights in general without specific consideration of the violation of the defendant’s
rights in this specific case. In comparison, an “as-applied” challenge would seek to invali-
date a statute based on the merits of the defendant’s specific Constitutional rights being
violated with this specific application. For a more complete discussion, see 16 C.J.S. Consti-
tutional Law § 243 (2017).
13. See Brief for Appellee at 3–4, Reece, No. 11–16–00196–CR, 2016 WL 6998930, at
*1 (2016) (describing emails and phone calls that Reece’s ex-wife reported by which she
was “annoyed and frightened”). Although Reece’s conduct may need punishment, other
remedies existed such as potential charges for intentional access without authorization to
his ex-wife’s Facebook account. See CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012).
14. 322 S.W.3d 662, 669–70. (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), abrogated by Wilson v. State, 448
S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding that a similar statute, Texas Penal Code
Section 42.07(a)(4), which related to telephone communications, did not have First
Amendment protection); see also Donald H. Flanary, III & Jessica J. Pritchett, Cyberspace:
A Constitutionally Protected Forum for Free Speech, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 489,
499–501 (2014) (synopsis of the Scott decision).
15. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4) (West 2017).
16. Reece, 2016 WL 6998930, at *3.
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Appeals refused Reece’s petition.17 But Presiding Judge Sharon Faye
Keller dissented (she also dissented in Scott).18 She argued that (1) elec-
tronic communication is much broader than the telephone communica-
tion in Scott, and (2) the limits proposed by the court in Scott had been
abandoned in a more recent case, Wilson v. State,19 which made the Scott
precedent ripe for re-evaluation.20 Her argument continued her prior dis-
sent in Scott where she emphasized the telephone anti-harassment stat-
ute’s vagueness21 and overbreadth.22 In Reece, she stated, “The breadth
of this statute can be accurately characterized as ‘breathtaking,’ and, as
such, is appropriate for review.”23 Specifically, she asserted that the stat-
ute proscribes “communications even if they have a legitimate communi-
cative purpose.”24
Because the anti-harassment statute criminalizes repeated communica-
tions that merely alarm or annoy, it is unconstitutionally overbroad and
needs to be limited. The statute is overbroad because its words are vague,
it lacks limiting language, and it extends to non-harassing
communications.
When a statute is unconstitutionally vague, it violates the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by not giving proper notice of prohib-
ited conduct or proper guidance to law enforcement.25 For example, an
ordinance criminalizing, among other things, “wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose” does not give
17. Ex parte Reece, 517 S.W.3d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam) (mem.
op.).
18. Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 671–77 (Keller, J., dissenting).
19. 448 S.W.3d 418, 422, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When deciding Scott, the Court
had limited the term repeated to multiple calls close enough to be considered a “single
episode.” Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 669 n.12. Likewise, the court held that harassing calls only
have an intent to “inflict emotional distress for its own sake.” Id. at 670. In Wilson, the
court abandoned both of these limits. For this reason, Judge Keller noted that four other
judges were ready to revisit Scott. Reece, 517 S.W.3d at 110 n.16 (Keller, J., dissenting).
20. Reece, 517 S.W.3d at 109–110.
21. See Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 671–72 (Keller, J. dissenting) (discussing Texas decisions
that held the terms alarm and annoy in earlier anti-harassment statutes similar to Section
42.07(a)(7) were vague).
22. Id. at 676 (“But nothing in the statute limits its application to those occasions when
the actor’s sole intent is to inflict emotional distress, and if the court is implying that situa-
tions are rare in which a person has more than one intent, I disagree. The mischief this
statute can create is enormous . . . .”).
23. Reece, 517 S.W.3d at 110 (Keller, J., dissenting). When Judge Keller wrote her
dissent, Section 42.07(b) of the Texas Penal Code only included a small non-inclusive list of
“electronic mail, instant message, network call, . . . facsimile machine[,] and . . . a pager.”
Id. at 109. The Texas legislature has since expanded the list to include “a cellular or other
type of telephone, a computer, a camera, text message, a social media platform or applica-
tion, an Internet website, [or] any other Internet-based communication tool” as types of
electronic communication but still does not limit the list to only those forms. David’s Law
§ 13 (codified at TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.07(b)(1)). This expanded list does nothing to fur-
ther limit the inclusiveness of terms such as alarm and annoy; it only expands the statute’s
breadth.
24. Reece, 517 S.W.3d at 111 (Keller, J. dissenting).
25. Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 665 n.2.; see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State
of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967) (holding a strict vagueness standard related to free-
dom of speech).
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proper notice of how a person can avoid that activity or when a police
officer can arrest a person.26 Additionally, when a statute is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad, it covers both protected and unprotected First
Amendment speech.27 Similarly, a statute meant to criminalize photo-
graphs taken without consent to gratify sexual urges is overbroad if the
language of the statute also includes public photography of celebrities by
a reporter.28 While both vagueness and overbreadth are independent rea-
sons to void a statute, vagueness can lead to overbreadth. Statutes that
have vague terms are prone to broad application that includes protected
First Amendment speech.29
First, the words alarm and annoy as used in Section 42.07(a)(7) are
vague. The Fifth Circuit ruled the words alarm and annoy are unconstitu-
tionally vague because the old Texas statute30 “[made] no attempt at all
to specify whose sensitivity must be offended.”31 Here, because alarm
and annoy are inherently subjective states of mind, the court is right to
declare them vague, absent some notice to whom they apply. Likewise,
Section 42.07(a)(7) lacks this specification. Judge Keller later adopted the
Kramer analysis in Long v. State,32 which invalidated a Texas stalking
statute33 that used words very similar to those in Section 42.07. She noted
the words alarm and annoy were now “joined by the words ‘harass,’
‘abuse,’ ‘torment,’ and ‘embarrass’” but that the words were joined by
“or” and thus did not limit the vagueness of alarm and annoy.34 She also
felt the new terms were subject to “uncertainties of meaning.”35 Thus, the
same problem still existed from Kramer. Despite the new words that were
added to the list, it was still too difficult to understand the prohibited
effect on sensitivities of unspecified individuals. Later, although the
newer statute still used the same vague words, the court in Scott equated
26. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1, 162 (1972). For a discus-
sion of vague laws and related prosecutorial harms, see Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Arm-
strong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1085–88 (1997).
27. Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 665 n.2. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
114 (1972) (holding statutes overbroad if they reach protected speech).
28. Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
29. See, e.g., BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW
& LITIGATION § 1:32 (2017 ed.) (comparing vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
30. Penal Code of 1973, ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 956 (amended 1983)
(current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.07).
31. Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983), reh’g granted, 716 F.2d 284,
vacated without addressing merits, 723 F.2d 1164 (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). Later, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the ruling explicitly as
applied to the same statute. May v. State, 765 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
32. 931 S.W.2d 285, 28–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“While the [Fifth Circuit] declined
to address the question of overbreadth [in Kramer], it nevertheless indicated that First
Amendment considerations were intertwined with the vagueness issue. . . . [T]he Fifth
Circuit held that the words ‘annoy’ and ‘alarm’ were inherently vague and that Texas
courts had not construed the terms to lessen their vagueness.”) (citations omitted).
33. Act of June 12, 1993, ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3677–78, (amended
1995) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072).
34. Long, 931 S.W.2d at 289.
35. Id.
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six terms used in Section 42.07 with “emotional distress” by citing Web-
ster’s dictionary36 without addressing Kramer or Long.37
Even though it did not address Kramer or Long, the court seemed to
recognize the need to limit the breadth of its opinion in Scott. The court
required that repeated communication be limited to a “single episode”38
and that violating calls would have no “intent to engage in . . . legitimate
communication.”39 But in Wilson, the court abandoned these require-
ments.40 Thus, the statute, as currently interpreted, is still vague and
overbroad.
Second, the anti-harassment law lacks language that would limit its
breadth. Other states that have encountered similar anti-harassment stat-
utes have ruled them either unconstitutionally vague41 or unconstitution-
ally overbroad.42 In addition to some state courts invalidating vague and
overbroad laws, other state legislatures have adopted laws that better
limit breadth.43 What these better anti-harassment laws have in common
is a level of scienter, or “knowledge that makes a person legally responsi-
ble,”44 that more narrowly matches the level of guilt that society should
punish. For example, these laws require that the harassing communica-
tion impart a reasonable fear of injury or property destruction to the re-
cipient,45 or that the communication lack any legitimate communication
36. Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 669 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), abrogated by Wil-
son v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
37. Id. at 669 (“First, the text requires that the actor have the specific intent to harass,
annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass the recipient of the telephone call. That is, the
text requires that the actor have the intent to inflict harm on the victim in the form of one
of the listed types of emotional distress.”).
38. Id. at 669 n.12.
39. Id. at 670.
40. See supra note 19; see also Wilson v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418, 426 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (Keller, J., concurring) (noting that the Scott precedent can now be applied to any
calls that occur at least twice and that facially legitimate communication does not bar
enforcement).
41. See State v. Codiamat, 317 P.3d 664, 665 n.1, 678–79 (Haw. 2013) (finding vague a
statute with the words “harass, annoy, or alarm”); People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 813
(N.Y. 2014) (finding vague a statute with the words “harass, annoy, threaten or alarm”).
42. See State v. Nowacki, 111 A.3d 911, 931 (Conn. App. 2015) (finding overbroad a
statute that included “harass, annoy or alarm” as applied to defendant); McKenzie v. State,
626 S.E.2d 77, 79 (Ga. 2005) (holding statute overbroad when not limited to only unwel-
come speech); State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 772 (Mont. 2013) (holding statute overbroad
when it included “intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend”); State v.
Pierce, 887 A.2d 132, 135 (N.H. 2005) (holding statute overbroad that included intent to
“annoy or alarm another”); People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 813 (N.Y. 2014) (holding
overbroad).
43. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108 (West 2017) (requiring threats of personal
injury or property damage or use of obscene, lewd, or profane language); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 711-1106(1) (West 2017) (using alarm and annoy but adding additional conditions
such as (a) physical contact, (b) provocation of immediate violent response, and (c) re-
peated electronic communication without legitimate communication purpose); MO. REV.
STAT. § 565.090 (West 2017) (requiring harassing communication be “without good cause”
and with “purpose to cause emotional distress”).
44. Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
45. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.120(a)(7) (West 2017) (requiring that harass-
ment “places the person in reasonable fear of physical injury”).
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purpose when sent.46 A Texas law modified to include a more specific
scienter requirement would exclude benign scenarios of legitimate com-
munication. Additionally, specific scienter requirement provides the level
of narrow construction that puts a potential defendant on notice of what
the law is and also provides better guidance to law enforcement and pros-
ecutors on what type of offenses to prosecute.
Third and finally, one can envision many types of non-harassing com-
munications protected by the Fourth Amendment that would trigger Sec-
tion 42.07(a)(7) because the statute uses the words alarm, annoy, and
embarrass as prohibited intents if they are also reasonably likely results.47
For example, when Hurricane Harvey recently made landfall on Texas
shores, a brother who sent more than one text message48 with intent to
alarm his sister to evacuate ahead of the storm could theoretically have
been prosecuted under the statute. His text messages fit the definition of
electronic communication.49 And the fact that the brother sent the text
message out of concern for his imperiled sister does not change the fact
that he still had an intent to alarm50 her. It is also “reasonably likely”51
that more than one text message urging someone to evacuate before a
hurricane makes landfall would alarm that person receiving it. Likewise,
imagine another scenario where a woman published a Facebook post that
advocated for change in Confederate names of Dallas schools,52 and she
posted several follow-up comments. Because she posted more than once,
she would meet the element of repeated. Because her intent, in part,53
46. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 14A (West 2017) (requiring the “sole
purpose” of repeated electronic communication be “harassing, annoying or molesting the
person”) (emphasis added).
47. In Judge Keller’s dissent in Scott, she reasons that “low intensity emotional states”
included in the statute can be used for legitimate communications protected under the First
Amendment. 322 S.W.3d 662, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), abrogated by Wilson v. State,
448 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Keller, J., dissenting). Judge Keller mentions the
following legitimate examples: (1) calls to Congress with an intent to annoy in order to
spur action on grievances; (2) political calls made to voters to alarm them to action; and (3)
messages left by a concerned friend to an adulterous husband on an answering machine in
hopes of embarrassing him when his wife overhears. Id.
48. Telephones, texting, and social media were all important tools for family communi-
cations during the storm. See Natalia E. Contreras, Hurricane Harvey: How to Stay in
Touch with Loved Ones During the Storm, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017,
11:07 PM), http://www.caller.com/story/news/2017/08/24/hurricane-harvey-how-stay-touch-
loved-ones-during-storm/600347001/ [https://perma.cc/BA9B-T4HH].
49. See discussion supra note 23.
50. Merriam-Webster defines alarm as “to give warning to.” Alarm, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
51. “Reasonably likely” has not been defined as a reasonable person standard but is
something less than that. Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
52. See Eva-Marie Ayala & Corbett Smith, Dallas ISD Wants to Strip Confederate
Names from Schools, but How?, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug 16, 2017, 5:50 PM), https://
www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2017/08/16/dallas-trustees-consider-renaming-
schools-honoring-confederates [https://perma.cc/777K-9YY9].
53. Recall that Wilson held that a “facially legitimate” message does not negate the
criminal culpability under the statute. Wilson v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014).
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was to either annoy54 or even embarrass55 those on Facebook who sup-
ported these Confederate names, and such language is likely to annoy or
embarrass those individuals, the statute includes her political Facebook
posts. Of course, neither of these scenarios deserves prosecution because
they lack a solely malicious intent to inflict emotional distress. The hurri-
cane scenario is an alarming set of text messages that are intended for the
sister’s benefit, and the political Facebook posts are intended to commu-
nicate legitimate political speech.
In conclusion, Texas should revisit Section 42.07 again because the cur-
rent statute is overbroad. The best law to protect children is a law that
can remain on the books. Having a law that is vulnerable to attack for
overbreadth and vagueness unnecessarily keeps Texas children in sus-
pense as to whether the law will protect them. By correcting this law
through elimination of vague terms or addition of limiting language,
Texas can best protect its children and vulnerable citizens. Texas should
look to other states’ less broad and less vague statutes for examples of
narrow but effective definitions of what electronic communications it
should punish for harassment.
54. Merriam-Webster defines annoy as “to disturb or irritate esp. by repeated acts.”
Annoy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
55. Merriam-Webster defines embarrass as “to place in doubt, perplexity, or difficul-
ties.” Embarrass, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
